US-built Mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region: Progress, Features and Its Impact

In recent years， to advance its so-called strategic competition with China， the United States （US） has increasingly prioritized forming cliques in an attempt to construct a topic-oriented “multilateral camp” for a more agile and nested partnership system. In particular， the US quickens its pace in putting together all sorts of mini-multilateral mechanisms， such as the US-Japan-India-Australia Quadrilateral Security Dialogue （QUAD）， through which the US hopes to shape China cognition of concerned countries， integrate their China strategies， and promote multiple policy objectives of security deterrence， reshaping supply chains， technology competition， and ideological suppression. The complex impact of US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms on China’s neighborhood strategic environment deserves high alert.

New Progress of US-Built

mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region

Advocating strategic competition with China， and continuing to play up so-called “China threat”， the Biden administration tries its best to construct “a latticework of strong and mutually reinforcing coalitions” in the Asian-Pacific region， especially focusing on diversiform and agile mini-multilateral mechanisms， promoting profound integration of its treaty allies and security partners like India， and seeking so-called position of strength vs. China.

First， comprehensively elevating the QUAD mechanism. The Biden administration has taken the QUAD as the core platform to advance its Indo-Pacific strategy， and elevated it to a heads-of-state and heads-of-government mechanism， with several summits having been held so far. The domains of cooperation for the QUAD have continued to expand， setting up working groups centering on agenda of maritime security， global health security， critical and emerging technologies， cyberspace， and infrastructure. Besides， the QUAD mechanism has further extended its partnership， first to cajole South Korea and Vietnam into becoming its partners to increase strategic restraint on China through such middle-sized powers， second to include other members of the Five Eyes Alliance like Canada and New Zealand， and third to stress on interaction with the ASEAN， on which the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States gives emphasis.

Second， accelerating consolidation of the AUKUS， a trilateral security pact between Australia， the United Kingdom （UK）， and the United States. In September 2021， the US， the UK and Australia announced the trilateral security partnership. As an alliance mechanism with evident offensive features， it also has become an important platform for the Biden administration to pursue integrated deterrence to China. To provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines is an important AUKUS objective， by which the US intends to enhance its ally’s blue-water submarine capabilities. On top of that， the AUKUS sets store by coordinating front-line military technologies and defense industries， reflecting US policy orientation of outsourcing defense capabilities. The mechanism focuses on such front-line military technologies as hypersonic and counter-hypersonic， electronic warfare， cyber-warfare， artificial intelligence and autonomous systems， quantum technology， and ocean floor capabilities. The military-industrial complexes of the US， the UK and Australia have also deepened cooperation， attempting to enhance integration of defense supply chains and defense industrial base， and joint R&D and production of military equipment and ammunition. It is worth noting that New Zealand， South Korea and India wish to participate in pertinent cooperation under the AUKUS trilateral security partnership framework.

Third， continuing to deepen trilateral coordination mechanisms such as the US-Japan-South Korea， and the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations. The Biden administration takes promotion of the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations for a main focal point. In its Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States， to enhance the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral relations is one of the ten items in action plan. In recent years， the US， Japan and South Korea have held several trilateral summits and conducted trilateral consultations of department heads on diplomacy， national security， military， and intelligence. Besides， the US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations have been substantially enhanced. Vigorously supported by the US， security relations between Japan and Australia have been markedly strengthened with the two Heads of states releasing a new Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. Both sides have hold several “two plus two” consultations of Foreign and Defense ministers， signing military agreements like Reciprocal Access Agreement. The US and Australia have invited Japan to station military forces in Australia， and Japan also considers sending advanced weaponry purchased from the US such as F-35s and other fighter aircraft on rotating deployment in Australia. It is noteworthy that the US wishes to rely on US-Japan-Australia trilateral relations for advancing its strategic alignment in Southeast Asia and South Pacific regions. For instance， the US， Japan and Australia have jointly enhanced the defense capabilities of the Philippines.

Features of US-Built

Mini-multilateral Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific Region

Continuing to strengthen Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms is an important link for the Biden administration to reshape its alliance strategy to address the so-called China threat. Such mini-multilateral mechanisms feature flexibility， cross-region， and extensiveness， by which the US tries to forge a multi-tiered， networking and nested alliance-partnership framework so as to organize camp confrontation and composite containment and suppression against China. Its main features are as follows：

First， Japan plays an increasingly critical role in US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms. The Biden administration vigorously promote modernization of US-Japan alliance， enhancing its security offensiveness， whereas Japan has availed itself of factors like the Ukraine crisis to make major adjustment to its military policy. In December 2022， the Japanese government released three major security papers， the National Security Strategy， the National Defense Strategy， and the Defense Buildup Plan， declaring to boost its defense spending from 1% to 2% of GDP in five years， and develop “enemy base strike capability”. As Japan’s defense spending increases from top nine in the world to top three， and as Japan continues to deepen security relations with Australia， India and Vietnam， the US wishes to urge Japan to take up the role of “co-sheriff” in US-led Asia-Pacific alliance-partnership system. The US has welcomed the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement and supports Japan to enter into agreements of military alliance with its European allies such as the UK and France. In economic and technological domains， Japan also plays a core role in US-built Asia-Pacific mini-multilateral mechanisms， for instance in Chip 4 alliance， part of a US strategy to put China under export control and reshape semiconductor supply chains.