US Strategic Competition with China and the Evolution of Order in the Asia-Pacific Region

As the international orderdominated by the US hegem-ony is being challenged， the United States has been making great efforts to strategically suppress China in the Asia-Pacific region， attempting to build a regional order framework underpinned by camp-based bloc politics， exclusive economic clubs， and Western-centered values-based al- liances.

US POLICY TRENDS INPRACTICING BLOC POLITICS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

After the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy which posi- tioned China as a strategic competitor， the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance released in March 2021 further posi- tioned China as the only country with the potential to compete with the US The US Indo-Pacific Strategy， released in February 2022， once again explic- itly stated that most of the challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region come from China， and hence proposed that the US will strengthen its institutions with allies and strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region in order to jointly respond to China’s rise. The contents of the strategy include ten actions covering military， trade and economy， supply chain， technology research and development， and cyber- space， among other areas. In the US National Security Strategy releasedin October of the same year， China is positioned as one of the global pri- orities and the only competitor with intent to reshape international order. Compared to the Trump administra- tion’s Indo-Pacific Strategy， the Biden administration has emphasized the return of US leadership in the Indo- Pacific region， focusing on deepening and strengthening the network of allies and partnerships. It also encour- ages allies and strategic partners to strengthen their ties， and draws in outside allies to intervene in the Indo- Pacific region， binding security， poli- tics， and economics with ideology to create an all-round bloc politics ecol- ogy to isolate and suppress China.

First， the US has vigorously strengthened its partnership withal- lies in the military and security fields. Through its military forces stationed in Japan， the Republic of Korea （ROK）， Australia， the Philippines， it enhances the military ties with its allies. By es- tablishing QUAD and AUKUS based on the Anglo-Saxon identity， the FVEY and other core alliance mechanisms， it has been gradually promoting com- prehensive cooperation with its allies in military and security. By engaging in multi-line interaction with its core allies， building a US-led regional military security integration system， and frequently holding joint military exercises with China as the imaginary enemy， the US strives to strengthen the sense of identity between itself and its regional allies and partners.For emerging partners， the US hasformed security partnerships throughregular military contacts， institutional-ized in defense cooperation of tradeand technology， as well as in-depthsecurity cooperation in logistical as-sistance， electronic communications，and information sharing. The US hasadopted a layered approach， dividingASEAN and focusing on roping in thePhilippines， Indonesia and Vietnam.At the same time， the US encouragesNATO and other major countries out-side the region to intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs， pushes its European al-lies to pay attention to the situation inthe Asia-Pacific region and the TaiwanStrait and actively intervene in Asia-Pacific affairs， increases its militarypresence in the South China Sea andthe Taiwan Strait， and deepens the in-tegration of the Eurasian alliance sys-tem. In addition， in June 2022， the USformed the Blue Pacific Partnershipwith Australia， Japan， New Zealand，and the U.K. This is the very first timethat the Biden administration has builtan alliance to counterbalance Chinain the Pacific Islands region. In March2023， the US Department of Defensewebsite released its defense budget forFiscal Year 2024， which emphasizedthe priority of considering developingstronger relationships and coopera-tion with US partners and allies toaddress the China challenges in theIndo-Pacific region. On the occasionof the G7 summit in May 2023， the USinvited India， Indonesia， Brazil， Vietnam， Australia， and the ROK to hold an expanded meeting in an attempt to further broaden its circle of allies.

Second， the US has established club-like exclusive mechanisms in the economic field with the goal of excluding China， weakening eco- nomic ties between its key allies and China， and ensuring US economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region. In May 2022， Biden announced the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework during his visit to Japan， declaring that the 14 member states had almost completed negotiations on an agreement to improve sup- ply chain resilience and security， in which the supply chains for essential materials， such as chips and key min- erals， will be strengthened in order to reduce reliance on China. In July 2022， US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen， during her visit to the ROK， strongly promoted the concept of friend-shoring. It seeks to break through the spatial and temporal limitations of supply chain coopera- tion， which will no longer be limited to Mexico and other US neighbor- ing countries， but will further in-clude all US allies with the so-called common values in areas like Latin America， East Asia， and South Asia. In September 2022， Biden signed an executive order proposing a special assessment of the national security risks posed by investors from rival or hostile countries， accelerating the im- plementation of friend-shoring and small yard with high walls policies. In March 2023， the US and its major allies gradually reached a consensus on the issue of de-risking from China， proposing the creation of a so-called diversified and resilient supply chain as an important part of the de-risking strategy towards China， and further stepping up the promotion of friend- shoring and near-shoring.

Third， the US has strengthened its efforts to break the chain and block the flow of technology on China. In November 2021， Biden signed the Se- cure Equipment Act， which prohibits countries from supplying China with high-end semiconductor chips made with US tools anywhere in the world. In July 2022， the US forced the Neth- erlands to prohibit its chip lithogra- phy equipment makers from sellingkey chip manufacturing technolo- gies to China. In August 2022， Biden signed the Chips and Science Act， which provides a total of $280 billion of investment for five years， while restricting subsidized firms from expanding high-tech investments in China and limiting their ability to help China expand its semiconductor capacity. In October 2022， the US De- partment of Commerce introduced a new ban on semiconductors in China， restricting chip equipment manu- facturers from exporting and invest- ing in China， and brought together Japan， the ROK， and Taiwan to form the Chip 4 Alliance with the aim of building a high-tech network and supply chain that excludes China， and further encircling the development of the semiconductor industry in China. In January 2023， the US brought together Japan and the Netherlands to sign an agreement on expanding restrictions on China’s chip technol- ogy. In the field of cyberspace， the US has jointly launched the Declaration for the Future of the Internet with the EU， the UK， Australia and Japan in an attempt to constrain China by formu- lating new rules for the Internet.