China’s Involvement in Global Digital Governance
作者: Zhang MonanOver a century ago, western countries achieved rapid development boosted by the industrial revolution and opened the door to world trade with “solid ships and strong cannons”. The “solid ships and strong cannons” in the digital era will shape the landscape of future development and competition. It is imperative to grasp the historic opportunities offered by the digital revolution and take on the challenges posed by global digital governance, which will put countries in a favorable position to tap the profound changes unseen in a century.
GLOBAL DIGITAL GOVERNANCE HAS BECOME THE “NEW RACE TRACK” FOR MAJOR POWER RIVALRY
The new technology revolution is poised to shape state-to-state relations. Digital economy is becoming a new high ground of strategic competition among major powers. Digital technology, digital rules and digital sovereignty are becoming the new focal areas of major power rivalry, mainly reflected in the following aspects.
First, the interaction between digital technology and geopolitics is growing. Following the trade war and tech war, the United States waged a new digital cold war against China. Geopolitically, the Indo-Pacific has become a critical region of digital rivalry. In Southeast Asia, the United States has stepped up its digital diplomacy with the ASEAN countries through the “Innovation Connect” program established within the framework of “U.S.-ASEAN Connect Initiative”.
Second, the trend of linking digital governance rules with values is growing. Certain countries link digital technologies with values such as the rule of law, institutions and even human rights. For example, the United States and other countries promote value-based digital diplomacy and form the Democracy and Technology (D-10/T-12) alliances.
Third, the competition in digital governance and rule-making is growing fiercer. In recent years, in efforts to maintain the “digital hegemony”, the United States has been expanding its global interests in the name of the so-called digital liberalism and through the World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement and the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement. The United States also led the introduction of the APEC Cross-border Privacy Rules System, including such countries as Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Mexico as signing parties. The European Union adopted the General Data Protection Regulation as a template for global data governance. The European Commission issued a strategic document titled Shaping Europe’s Digital Future, proposing to adopt a “global digital cooperation strategy” committed to forming universally-applied international standards and rules for digital economy. Such measures reveal the ever more intense competition of international rule-making in the digital arena.
Fourth, the global digital protectionism is rising. In recent years, digital sovereignty has gradually become a key component of core national interests. Countries have launched an all-round campaign for interests, positions and rivalries of digital sovereignty. The United States, Japan and the European Union have taken concrete actions to set rules and regulations for the digital arena by exercising legislation, law enforcement and jurisdiction.
A LANDSCAPE OF CHINA-U.S.-EU COMPETITION HAS BEEN INITIALLY FORMED IN GLOBAL DIGITAL GOVERNANCE
With an eye on the global digital governance, we can see that the United States and the European Union dominate two major digital governance systems in the world. In the meantime, Japan, China, Russia, India, Canada and South Korea have developed their own advantages, but are yet to compete with the United States and Europe in terms of dominance and position in global digital governance.
First, the United States expands its digital interests globally through free cross-border data flows.
The strategic intention of the United States is to expand its global interests as a digital hegemony through the free cross-border data flows, and gradually form the “American template” for digital governance. In this template, externally, the United States advocates the so-called free trade, requires other countries to open their market and lower market access threshold, and puts forward such initiatives as the cross-border free flows of data, non-localized storage and exemption of maintenance platforms. Internally, instead of implementing the rules of free cross-border data flows and non-localized storage advocated by itself, the United States requires localized storage of key data, imposes stricter screening on foreign capital that acquires American enterprises through legislative authorization, and employs a package of taxation, financial, fiscal and judicial means to press its global advantages in cutting-edge fields with a whole-of-government strategy. Thus it can be seen that the United States adopts blatant double standards externally and internally.
Second, the European Union leverages on the single market to dominate digital sovereignty and promote EU standards.
The European Union exports more EU standards through its huge single market and its pursuit of digital sovereignty. Externally, the European Union produces the “Brussels effect” through its enormous rule-making capability and huge single market, and introduces more European standards to the world by seeking technical sovereignty and digital sovereignty. Internally, the European Union itself doesn’t have many large native digital multinationals, but a vast number of American enterprises are present in Europe. Therefore, the European Union delivers its policies by improving internal regulations and strengthening the management of large-sized platform enterprises. In addition, the European Union also gains competitive advantages by imposing strict foreign investment review and creating and preserving market order.