Challenges and Rules in Third Age of Space

As the space gradually becomes a multi-polar and industrialized battlefield， we human beings are entering Space 3.0. In this new era， existing international rules on space arms control can no longer effectively address increasing security risks such as arms races， armed conflicts， collisions of space objects and competition for space resources. We need more than ever to achieve consensus on space security in the new era to build new space security order.

SPACE IS FACING INCREASINGLY SERIOUS SECURITY CHALLENGES

If we regard the Cold War space competition between the U.S. and the USSR as the start of Space 1.0 and the Gulf War as the beginning of Space 2.0， we are making our way to Space 3.0. The space security challenges at this stage have following three prominent features.

First， space is increasingly crowded with higher risks of space collisions. In the era of Space 3.0， multi-polarization leads to a more balanced， vitalized but more crowded space. Problems of collisions between satellites and space junk are particularly acute. According to NASA， there are currently around 2，600 defunct satellites， 10，000 objects that are bigger than a computer screen， 20，000 that are the size of an apple， half a million the size of a marble and at least 100 million parts that are so small that they cannot be tracked. In February 2009， an inactive Russian satellite collided with an U.S.-based Iridium satellite. This is the first collision occurred between two satellites， after which similar cases took place one after another. In January 2013， a Russian satellite was destroyed after colliding with a piece of space junk weighing less than 0.02 grams. In June 2021， a robotic arm of the International Space Station was damaged after being hit by space junk. In July and October 2021， China’s Space Station was forced to take emergency actions to dodge two approaching Starlink satellites.

Second， risks of arms races and armed conflicts will rise as space becomes a battlefield. Militarization of space started when the mankind first entered space. In Space 1.0 and 2.0， effects of militarization are limited. But in Space 3.0， space itself will become a battlefield and space forces will be used as an independent military force for offensive and defensive operations， which can be manifested in following aspects.

First， countries are racing to build space forces. In 2019， the U.S. established the Space Development Agency， the Space Command and the Space Force. France， Japan， the UK， India and Germany then followed suit and built their own space forces. Second， risks of space arms race are rising dramatically. Most people believe that the process of weaponization of space has not yet begun since no country has deployed nuclear， kinetic kill or laser weapons in orbit. But we are approaching this red line. Third， space warfare is increasingly imminent. In Space 3.0， space is an independent area which has a close connection with land， naval and air forces. Since satellite attacks and defenses will not necessarily lead to a nuclear war， space forces seems to be an ideal choice to countries worldwide. At the same time， to maintain its unique advantage in space， which is being undermined， the U.S. attempts to compete by any means necessary with other major countries in a whole-of-government model， and is more likely to resort to forces first. The U.S. makes it clear in its Space Defense Strategy that， it will fight and win a space war if its deterrence strategy in space fails. This， however， could easily trigger conflicts between the major powers.

Third， development of space resources leads to fierce competition. Development of commercial spaceflight was limited in Space 1.0 and 2.0， but competition for various space resources becomes more vigorous in Space 3.0 with acceleration of the development of space industry. For example， the development of Large Satellites Constellations has made geostationary orbit very popular for its great economic and practical value. Technological developments are turning the mineral resources of space， which were once out of reach， into a real source of wealth. As the U.S. space strategist Peter Garretson once said， what countries are competing for on the Earth worth no more than 1% of a country’s GDP， while the value of space resources is times greater than the total global GDP. Countries that are good at exploiting space resources will gain an advantage disproportionate to their territory and population. The major aerospace powers are trying to figure out ways to get a bigger slice of cake in the “gold rush in space”， which will become a source of conflict in Space 3.0.

INTERNATIONAL RULES ON SPACE ARMS CONTROL NEED TO BE IMPROVED

To constrain the militarization of space， the international community signed a series of treaties in the 1960s and 1970s， outlining the basic principles for safeguarding space security and some restrictive provisions. But these rules are not sufficient to meet security challenges in Space 3.0.

First， the existing rules on space arms control can’t fit current situation well. Current rules， which mainly include three major platforms and five major treaties， were adopted in the early days of Space 1.0. The three major platforms are the UN General Assembly， the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs， and Conference on Disarmament. The five major treaties include the Outer Space Treaty， the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts， the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space， the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects， the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space， and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. These treaties have enabled the international community to establish fundamental principles such as space being the common heritage of the mankind， peaceful use of space and prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space.

Second， the competition among major powers for setting rules on space arms control has intensified. Since around 2010， countries worldwide have been increasingly enthusiastic about discussing and formulating international rules on space arms control， which is also a prominent feature of Space 3.0. Three initiatives have had a significant impact， i.e. the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space， the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects; the 2008 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities， and the UK proposed Reducing Space Threats through Norms， Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors， which calls on countries to reach a consensus on what constitutes responsible behaviors in space. International rules on space arms control suddenly attract wide attention for three main reasons. First， the sharp increase of space security risks makes it a consensus to strengthen existing international rules on space arms control. Thus many UN General Assembly resolutions on space security are passed with high number of votes. Second， the U.S. regards democratization of space as a challenge to its space hegemony and is eager to dominate the rule-setting in Space 3.0. Third， space arms control and international space governance are becoming increasingly integrated， with some new rules on space arms control being adopted in the name of peaceful utilization of space.