Latin America’s New “Pink Tide”

The left has dominated the political landscape of Latin America since the beginning of the 21st century. With the election of Hugo Chávez as President of Venezuela in late 1998， the cycle of “Pink Tide” began and lasted until around 2016. Since then， there has been a situation featuring the retreat of the left and the advance of the right in Latin America， which lasted only for about three years. Starting in 2018， and with Fernández， the candidate of the left-wing coalition Front for All elected President of Argentine in 2019， there was a clear swing back to the left in the Latin American political landscape. Between 2020 and 2022， left-wing parties have won elections in Bolivia， Peru， Nicaragua， Honduras， Chile and Colombia， returning Latin America to a majority of left-wing government， which is interpreted as a new “Pink Tide” by the outside world.

THE CAUSES OF THE NEW “PINK TIDE”

Since the tide of democratization in the 1970s， major shifts of Latin America’s political ecology have been closely related to systemic crises in the region， and the “Pink Tide” of the early 21st century was a reflection and critique of the defects of Neo-liberalism. In contrast， the new “Pink Tide”this time around is more of a reflection on ineffective national governance in the region. Specifically， the causes for the formation of the new “Pink Tide” in Latin America can be examined at the following levels.

First， ineffective national governance and COVID-19 pandemic attribute to a “shortened shelf life” of the right-wing ruling cycle. The second decade of the 21st century is considered another “lost decade” for Latin America. Especially between 2014 and 2019， its annual GDP growth rate on the average was only 0.4%， which was not even close to thatof the preceding “lost decade” （0.5%） ， the debt crisis of the 1980s. This governance predicament led to a gradual ebbing of the “Pink Tide”. However， the performance of right-wing governments was equally unsatisfactory. Under the then dominant right-wing governments， regional countries were further marginalized in the global economy. In 2019， poverty rate and extreme poverty rate in Latin America increased to 30.8% and 11.5% respectively. Due to the continued ineffectiveness of economic and living standard governance， social tensions arising in the late years of the “Pink Tide” were not ameliorated. Prior to the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic， the major countries in Latin America faced heat street politics， with improvement on livelihood issues， such as education， healthcare， sanitation and taxation， becoming the main interest of the general public.

In 2020， the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the systemic economic and social crisis in Latin America. First of all， Latin America was a region where epidemic governance was poor across the globe. Peru， Mexico， Brazil， Colombia and Argentina were among countries of the world with hightest COVID fatality rate. Secondly， the epidemic dealt a heavy blow to econom and livelihood of Latin American countries once more. In 2020， Latin American economies contracted by almost 7%， with per capita GDP regressing to that of 2009 and poverty increasing significantly. According to the statistics of UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean （UNECLAC）， the epidemic has made poverty rate in Latin America regress to the level of 2007 and extreme poverty rate， to that of 1995. In other words， the COVID-19 pandemic has wiped out the achievement of Latin America in poverty reduction over the last 20 years.

The two factors above have a huge impact on public opinion in the region， as the 2021 Americas Barometer survey results show that the average government approval rating in Latin American countries was merely 40% in 2020， and the average presidential approval rating was even lower at 32%. In such a situation， elections are prone to produce a higher ideological turnover rate. For example， for the last 2 to 3 years， within the right-wing government cycle， Latin American countries have seen a succession of left turns.

Secondly， the solid base of left-wing forces has made a new “Pink Tide” possible. The Pink Tide that happened in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century lasted for more than ten years， and during the period the left-wing parties built on a broad popular base and gained a pivotal position in the political landscape. Although the “Pink Tide” began to ebb in 2015， the foundation of left-wing power remained solid. For example， in the 2015 elections in Argentina， the left-wing coalition Front for Victory lost the presidential election but maintained its position as the foremost political force in parliament with 39 seats in the Senate and 95 seats in the Chamber of Deputies; the Brazilian Labour Party lost the 2018 elections but maintained its position as the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies.

Besides， following the ebb of the last “Pink Tide”， Latin American left-wing parties have shown two policy tendencies. First， they have strengthened their dialogue with the grassroots through pluralistic policy initiatives and social media channels， and particularly in response to the issue of corruption that had induced the ebb of the previous “Pink Tide”， they have strengthened inner party ethical and disciplinary building， in an attempt to win over popular trust and approbation. Secondly， They have put in place broader coalitions of parties， and political allies are no longer confined to left-wing parties. For example， in the 2021 Chilean elections， the winning Gabriel Boric formed a left-wing electoral coalition， Constitutional Dignity， which included 8 to 9 left-wing political forces; in the 2022 Colombian elections， the winning Gustavo Petro formed an even broader left-wing coalition front， covering 20 parties and political organizations ranging from the radical left to the centre left. The results show that the left’s approach to strengthening links with the grassroots and expanding the alliance front has had a significant effect and has been an important factor in the left’s regaining political advantage after a short period of retreat.