The Myth of the “Aging Society”“老龄化社会”之迷思
作者: 安德鲁·J.斯科特/文 崔佳艳/译Economic doomsayers have long warned that the aging populations of industrial and post-industrial countries represent a “demographic time bomb.” Societal aging is bad news for the economy, they say, because it means that fewer people work and contribute to economic growth, and more people collect pensions and demand health care.
经济悲观论者早就提醒说,老龄化是工业化和后工业化国家的人口定时炸弹。他们称社会老龄化于经济不利,因其意味着劳动人口减少以及养老金领取人数和医疗保健需求人数增加。
The United Nations estimates that between now and 2050, the share of the population aged 60 and older will increase in every country. Though life expectancy tends to be highest in advanced economies, it is growing fastest in emerging markets. The number of people aged 60 and over in developing countries is currently twice that of the developed world. And the UN expects a three-to-one ratio by 2030, and a four-to-one ratio by 2050.
据联合国估计,从目前到2050年,所有国家的60岁及以上人口占比都会有所上升。虽然发达国家人口的预期寿命往往最长,但新兴市场国家人口的预期寿命增长最快。目前,发展中国家60岁及以上人口数量是发达国家的两倍,联合国认为到2030年将增长为3倍,到2050年为4倍。
Within many countries, increased life expectancy and declining birth rates are pushing up the average age of the population. In Japan, the median age has risen from 26 in 1952 to 49 today. In China, it has risen from 24 to 39 over the same period, and is expected to reach 48 by 2050.
在许多国家,预期寿命延长和出生率不断降低正推动着人口平均年龄不断攀升。比如日本的中位数年龄已从1952年的26岁增长到如今的49岁。同期,中国的中位数年龄也从24岁增长到39岁,到2050年预计会增长到48岁。
The argument that aging will weaken these countries’ economies stems from what economists call the old-age dependency ratio (OADR)—the proportion of the population over 64, relative to the working-age population (those aged 15 to 64). If one assumes that old people are unproductive consumers of government benefits, then a rising OADR implies slower economic growth and mounting pressure on public budgets.
老龄化会削弱国家经济这一论点源于经济学家口中的老年抚养比,即64岁以上人口与劳动年龄(15—64岁)人口之比。假设老年人不具备生产能力,只是政府福利的消费者,那么老年抚养比的增长意味着经济发展变缓以及公共预算压力逐渐增加。
But what if this assumption is mistaken? Governments are concerned about your age not because they want to know how many candles to buy for your birthday cake, but because it affects productivity and health-related spending. And if those are the factors that really matter, then the changing conditions of aging are far more rele-vant than the share of the population that has reached some arbitrary1 threshold2 of years on the planet.
但倘若这一假设是错的,会是什么样?政府关心你的年龄,原因不在于想了解要为你的生日蛋糕买多少根蜡烛,而是因为年龄会对生产力和医疗支出产生影响。如果这些因素确实重要,那么,比起地球上达到任意某个年龄值的人口占比,老龄化的变动状况更有意义。
Measuring aging gracefully
老龄化的细致判定
The concept of “aging” is not as straightforward as it seems. Obviously, aging has a chronological component, expressed in the straightforward question: “How old are you?” But it can also be viewed in terms that are biological (“You look good for your age”), subjective (“You are as old as you feel”), and sociological (“You shouldn’t be doing that at your age”). Policymakers’ sole focus on chronological age3 is a 200-year-old artifact from the era when governments first started keeping reliable birth records.
“老龄化”概念看似直白,其实不然。它含有明显的时间要素,体现在简单的问句中,如“您多大了?”。但还可以从其他角度来看待这个概念,包括生理学(“您看着显年轻”)、主观意义(“您觉着自己多大年纪就多大年纪”)和社会学(“您这个年纪不应该这么做了”)。政府对出生记录最早可靠的记载就只关注实际年龄,至今已有200年传统。
If the various dimensions of aging could be embodied in a single immutable4 concept, focusing on a benchmark such as chronological age would not be a problem. Yet the biological, subjective, and sociological components of aging are not immutable. On the contrary, their relationships with one another have shifted over time.
如果不同层面的老龄化可以体现在单一恒定的概念中,那么只以实际年龄为基准是不存在什么问题的。然而,生物、主观和社会意义上的老龄化并非一成不变的,彼此间的关系会随时间的推移而改变。
The average age of the US population has steadily increased since 1950, but the average mortality rate has trended down. In other words, the average US citizen has become chronologically older but biologically younger. And the same trends can be found in other advanced economies, including the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, and Germany.
自1950年以来,美国人口平均年龄持续稳定上升,平均死亡率却呈下降趋势。换言之,美国普通民众的实际年龄变大,生理年龄却更小了。英国、瑞典、法国和德国在内的其他发达国家也存在类似趋势。
Given the decline in average mortality, one cannot say unambiguously5 that these societies have aged. Average mortality rates are driven by two factors, only one of which could properly be called “aging.” As countries industrialize, they undergo a “demographic transition” from higher to lower birth rates. This shift implies that older cohorts of the population will increase in size, and that average overall mortality will rise, because mortality rates are higher for older people.
考虑到平均死亡率的下降,无法明确地说上述国家已老龄化。推动平均死亡率上升的因素有二,准确地说老龄化只是其中一个因素。随着国家工业化的发展,各国经历从高出生率到低出生率的“人口转型”。这意味着老年人口规模将会变大,且总体平均死亡率将上升,因为老年人中死亡率更高。
But over the past few decades, this aging effect has been offset by a “longevity effect”. Owing to medical advances and other factors (for example, lower rates of smoking), mortality rates at all ages have fallen. In actuarial6 terms, this means that people are younger for longer. Whereas the aging effect captures changes in the age distribution, the longevity effect addresses how we are aging. And in a country like the US, where the average age has increased while average mortality rates have fallen, it is clear that the longevity effect has more than offset the aging effect.